rigorous evidence that proxy advisory firm recommendations are correct or that they increase shareholder value. To this end, some corporate directors suggest that the recommendations of these firms are arbitrary and not in the interest of shareholders.
exchAnge offers
It is difficult to examine the impact of proxy advisory firm voting recommendations on shareholder value because the algorithms and data used by these firms are considered proprietary. This lack of transparency means that there is not an accessible database that can readily be used by researchers to study their impact on corporate outcomes. However, for a variety of reasons, it is possible to examine the influence of proxy advisory firms in one area of voting: exchange offers. An exchange offer (or repricing) is a transaction in which employees holding stock options are allowed to exchange those options for new options, restricted shares, or (less frequently) cash. Exchange offers occur when stock options are trading out-of-the-money to such an extent that it is unlikely that they will become profitable in the near future.
The board of directors initiates the exchange process by evaluating the distribution of employee option holdings, the potential incentive and retention effects, the impact on shareholders, and the cost of implementation. Shareholder approval to implement an exchange may or may not be required, depending on the terms of the equity plan under which awards were initially granted. If shareholder approval is not required, the board can approve and implement an exchange. If shareholder approval is required, the board must seek approval at either the regular annual meeting or a special meeting. Even Do ISS VotIng RecommenDatIonS cReate ShaReholDeR Value? when a plan is implemented, however, employees are not required to accept the offer for either vested or unvested equity holdings (see Exhibit 1).
Exchange offers are controversial matters. On one hand, they can be an effective way to restore value to equity awards that has been lost due to market forces (such as recession or industry downturn) outside employees' control. When successful, exchange offers renew the promise of financial reward if the firm is successful and reduce voluntary turnover among key employees who might otherwise leave to work at other companies. On the other hand, exchange offers can signal a culture of entitlement. Frequent repricings encourage the expectation that equity awards will pay out regardless of performance. Exchange offers also create a shareholder relations challenge in that investors often question why employees receive sweetened compensation when they themselves have suffered steep losses.
The largest proxy advisory firm, ISS, has developed publicly disclosed guidelines that it uses to determine whether to recommend a vote in favor or against a proposed exchange. ISS takes into account factors such as the stock's historical trading pattern, the stated reason for the exchange, the relative value offered through the exchange, whether surrendered options are cancelled or can be reissued, whether officers and directors are allowed to participate, and the vesting schedule, terms, and price of the new options. For example, ISS will recommend against any exchange offer in which named executive officers or directors are allowed to participate or when new options vest in less than six months (see Exhibit 2).
The recommendations of ISS are not inconsequential. Bethel and Gillan (2002) find that an unfavorable recommendation from ISS can reduce shareholder support by 13.6 percent to 20.6 percent, depending on the matter of the proposal. Morgan, Poulsen, and Wolf (2006) find that the impact is greater than 20 percent on compensationrelated issues.
5 Survey data supports the perception of influence. In a 2010 survey by Towers Watson, 59 percent of corporate officers believed that proxy advisors have significant influence on executivepay decisions at U.S. companies. 6 Similarly, a 2010 study by the Center on Executive Compensation found that 54 percent of companies had changed or adopted a compensation plan or policy in the previous three years primarily to meet the standards of a proxy advisory firm.
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In a recent working paper, Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2011) examine the impact of ISS voting policies on 272 exchange offers during 2004 to 2009. 8 They find that 39 percent of shareholder-approved plans that are reviewed by ISS are compliant with ISS guidelines. When the sample is expanded to include plans that do not require shareholder approval, the authors estimate that only 23 percent are compliant. The discrepancy suggests that companies alter the terms of a plan to gain ISS approval when a shareholder vote is required.
More importantly, these researchers observe a positive stock price reaction to exchange offers, suggesting that shareholders view these proposals as value increasing. However, the stock price reaction is significantly less positive when the exchange offer is constrained to meet ISS guidelines. The authors also find that future operating performance is lower and executive turnover is higher when the exchange program is constrained in the manner recommended by ISS. These results indicate that ISS recommendations on stock option exchanges do not increase, and in fact actually decrease, shareholder value. • 217,436,251 (~66% of those eligible) were accepted for cancellation • 83,046,296 new options were granted in return terms of the exchange program (apr. 14, 2008):
• officers and directors are not eligible • options granted within the past year will be eligible for exchange • employees can receive 1 share of restricted stock for every 2 options surrendered (not valuefor-value for some options) • new awards will vest semi-annually over 2 years (shorter than the original vesting) tender offer initiated, term sheets and instructions provided to employees (May 15, 2008) tender offer closed (Jun. 16, 2008) • 2,002,100 (~55% of those eligible) were accepted for cancellation Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:
• Historic trading patterns;
• rationale for the repricing;
• Value-for-value exchange;
• treatment of surrendered options;
• option vesting;
• term of the option;
• exercise price; • Participation.
if the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company's three-year average burn rate.
Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote. 
